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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the district court 
involving domestic relations cases including divorces pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h), 
confer jurisdiction upon this court to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: The first issue, as framed by Appellant, is: "That the trial 
court erred in denying Appellant's motion for new trial." The issue as described by 
Appellant should more properly be framed as: "Did the trial court apply the proper 
legal analysis in denying Appellant's motion for new trial, and in so doing did the 
trial court abuse its discretion?" 
STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW: The legal standard to be applied is a matter 
of law and reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the trial court. 
Saleh v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 133 P.2d 428, 2006 UT 20 However, the 
trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for new 
trial, and the appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Marchandv. Marchand, 147 P.3d 548 (Utah App. Ct. 2006) 
ISSUE 2: As framed by Appellant, "If the Court of Appeals Fails to Grant a 
New Trial it Will Be Sanctioning a Novel Method for Circumventing the 
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Guarantees of the U.S. Constitution of Due Process of Law and Equal Protection 
Under the Law." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Appellee cannot comprehend the issue as stated 
by Appellant, it appearing to merely be a statement of Appellant's opinion. In 
framing this issue, his brief is entirely devoid in substance of either fact or law. 
Appellee thus believes the issue as stated is not reviewable. Appellee's request for 
attorney's fees incurred to respond is governed by Rule 33(c)(2), Utah R. App. P., 
and is a matter of first impression for the appellate court. 
ISSUE 3: As framed by Appellant, "That the trial court erred in determining 
Appellant's financial need by failing to make any allowance for taxes, including 
Federal income taxes and Social Security taxes, and Utah state income taxes." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate courts should not upset the trial 
court's determination of financial determinations in the absence of manifest 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 
866 (Utah App. Ct. 1998) 
ISSUE 4: As framed by Appellant: "That the trial court erred in determining 
Appellant's financial need by failing to make any allowance for: The expense of 
owning an automobile; The expense of making major purchases; or adequate 
allowance for the expense of clothing; entertainment, or travel." 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate courts should not upset the trial 
court's apportionment of financial responsibilities in the absence of manifest 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 
866 (Utah App. Ct. 1998) 
ISSUE 5: As framed by Appellant: 'That the trial court erred in determining 
Appellant's financial need by making no allowance for funds for retirement." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court should review the trial 
court's award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 
230 (Utah 1997) The appellate court should not disturb the trial court's award so 
long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the 
appellate courts. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
ISSUE 6: As framed by Appellant: "That the trial court erred by failing to 
give any consideration to equalizing the parties standards of living after divorce and 
failed to make any finding as to the parties standard of living during marriage." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate courts review the trial court's 
award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997) The appellate court should not disturb the trial court's award so long as the 
trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts. 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
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ISSUE 7: As framed by Appellant: "That the trial court erred by failing to 
make any adjustment in its award of property or alimony in consideration of the fact 
that the Appellee's earning capacity had been greatly enhanced during the marriage 
by the efforts of both parties." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate courts review the trial court's 
award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997) 
ISSUE 8: As framed by Appellant: "That the trial court erred in finding that 
the Appellant can earn $32,000 per year immediately when he has been out of the 
work force for 20 years, suffers from significant health problems, and when his 
average earnings per year before marriage were $3,230." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When challenging a trial court's findings, an 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
Crouse v. Crowe, 817 P.2d 836, |21 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) The appellate courts 
then review the trial court's award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Willey v. 
Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) 
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ISSUE 9: As framed by Appellant: "That the trial court's decree is based 
upon illegal sexual prejudice." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court should review the trial 
court's award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 
230 (Utah 1997) The appellate court should not disturb the trial court's award so 
long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the 
appellate courts. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
Further, because this argument as posed in Appellant's brief is not supported by any 
facts which could support appellate review, Appellee's request for attorney's fees 
incurred to respond is governed by Rule 33(c)(1), Utah R. App. P. as a matter of 
first impression for the appellate court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Immediately prior to trial the parties arrived at a partial settlement which 
resolved joint physical custody of their nearly 18 year old son and a near equal 
division of their $175,000 stock account, less their son's tuition expense for the last 
year. Kenneth was awarded the marital residence without encumbrance as his sole 
property, the parties effected a division of their personal property, and they each 
agreed to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. Marianna was to receive an 
amount equal to the value of the home from her TIAA/Cref retirement account, and 
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balance of this account was to be divided between the parties. (No transcript of the 
stipulation was requested, however the trial court recognized the relevant terms in 
its Findings of Fact). 
Three issues were left for consideration by trial, to wit: 1) fine-tuning parent-
time arrangements with the child; 2) Kenneth's claim for a credit related to 
construction of the home from pre-marital funds; and 3) Kenneth's claim for 
alimony. The trial was conducted over four days, four witnesses were examined 
and crossed, and the trial court received 27 exhibits. The vast majority of the trial 
involved Kenneth's request for alimony. The trial court ruled that after imputing 
income to Kenneth, his expenses did not establish a further need for alimony and 
his request was denied. Thereafter Kenneth, acting pro se, filed a motion for new 
trial arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective in three ways related to trial 
preparation. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal challenging the 
decision to award no alimony ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To support an award of alimony at trial, Kenneth generally testified that over 
the 18 years of marriage he remained unemployed so he could support Marianna's 
career from home, and that he had certain health problems that prohibited his 
employment. Marianna testified that Kenneth was essentially a malingerer who 
6 
refused to financially support the family long after he completed construction of the 
home and after their son had entered school, choosing to instead pursue his own 
selfish, nonproductive interests. 
Prior to meeting Marianna, Kenneth had been working as a union carpenter 
earning $14-$ 15 per hour. (TT P. 265) When they met in 1978 Kenneth was just 
beginning to take courses for a B.A. at UT-Austin. He earned 17 credit hours in the 
spring 1978, but dropped out before completing his courses in during the fall of 
1978. At that time Marianna urged him to complete the courses, but he preferred to 
return to working as a carpenter in San Antonio. (TT PP. 414-417) As the parties 
dated between 1979 and 1982, Kenneth worked as a self-employed carpenter in San 
Antonio, but he was not industrious in either his work or promoting his business. 
(TT PP. 548-549) 
Before the parties ever met, Marianna had already completed her B.A. at the 
University of Colorado supported by her parents, scholarships, student loans and 
working. (Trial Transcript [TT] P. 411) Marianna had also completed several years 
of graduate work at The University of Texas at Austin (UT-Austin) supported by 
Work Study jobs, Teaching Assistantships, Research Assistantships, and 
fellowships. (TT P. 412) By 1978, Marianna had completed the coursework 
required for her Ph.D. program of study. (TT PP. 378 and 411) These 
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accomplishments were the foundation of her career in academia, and all had 
occurred before she met Kenneth. (TT PP. 216 & 379) Before applying for her job 
at the University of Utah, Marianna had already published several scholarly articles. 
(TT P. 435) Publication of these articles was necessary for the attainment of a job 
at a research university like the University of Utah. 
Four years before their marriage the parties moved to Utah and began 
residing together Marianna finally received her academic appointment in 1982. By 
the time of her move, Marianna had also completed a good part of the work for her 
dissertation. (TT P. 413) At trial Kenneth expressed a belief that he was largely 
responsible for Marianna's Ph.D. dissertation, but in fact Marianna testified that 
Kenneth provided her with little assistance. (TT P. 379) 
After arriving in Salt Lake before marriage, Kenneth obtained his general 
contractor's license, and in a later job application indicated that he made $25.00 per 
hour during this period. (TT P.264) 
When the parties married in 1986, Marianna continued to encourage Kenneth 
to complete his B.A. because he could have taken advantage of a tuition waiver 
benefit provided to her and her dependents through the University of Utah. Instead, 
Kenneth chose to try his hand at being a general contractor and so he began to 
design and build a marital residence. (TT PP. 414-417) To the exclusion of any 
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other activity, Kenneth took the next six years to complete the house. (TT P. 550) 
After obtaining her Ph.D., Marianna sought tenure at the university during 
1988-89, sixteen years before trial. Kenneth helped with the research for one article 
under Marianna's supervision, and helped with a reading passage for another article. 
However, Marianna also had other paid research assistants who aided in this 
project. These other assistants and Kenneth were properly acknowledged for their 
work. (TT P. 437) When she was initially denied in the fall of 1989, Marianna 
appealed. (TT P. 440). Marianna hired an attorney and Kenneth did assist with 
some research, but Marianna also assisted with the appeal process while she 
continued to work full-time. (TT PP. 439-440) 
After Kenneth finished the family home, he never sought employment. (TT 
P.448) Instead, whenever the family needed financial assistance he pushed 
Marianna to ask for raises at the university. (TT P. 441) One way to receive a 
significant salary increase is to get another job offer, and to that end Marianna 
embarked upon a solo effort to seek out and find alternate positions at other 
universities in different states to meet the families needs. (TT P. 389) Kenneth 
played only a small role in her application for those positions. 
Kenneth's narrative of assistance to Marianna's career indicated a tapering off 
roughly fifteen years before the trial. During that time Marianna was made head of 
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Linguistics at the University of Utah from 1993-2004 due to her own efforts. 
Marianna received better than average raises from the Dean of the school because 
of her success in building up the Linguistics program, and then moving it from a 
Program status to full Department status. (TT P. 527) During this time Kenneth 
was actually a detriment to her career because he often showed anger when he 
attended social events, and he often refused to work-related functions. (TT PP. 
443-444) 
In support of his request for alimony at trial, Kenneth suggested that his 
employability had been compromised because he had been forced to stay home to 
care for the parties' son, Sean. However, the trial court heard evidence to the 
contrary. The parties' son was born while Kenneth was still working on the 
residence. Marianna was effectively the primary caretaker for Sean in the first year 
of his life although she worked full-time (TT P. 389) After the parties moved into 
the house when Sean was 14 months old, Marianna continued in her primary 
caretaking duties whenever home from work, as well as every weekend. Kenneth 
and Marianna shared childcare duties at about a ratio of 60/40. (TT P. 426-429) 
Despite the fact that Kenneth never obtained employment after the home was 
completed, he placed their son Sean in childcare for most of his young life so that 
he could pursue his personal interests during the day while Marianna was working. 
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(TT P. 428) Often Marianna would come home to find that Kenneth had not done 
dishes or prepared meals. Marianna would be required to fulfill these workday 
duties both before and after Sean was born. (TT P. 519) Marianna left town for 
scholastic conferences only twice a year, usually 4 days each time. (TT P. 444) By 
the time of the parties1 separation in late 2003, primary responsibility for sixteen 
year-old Sean had reverted to Marianna, including making his breakfasts, taking 
him to school and picking him up form school most days of the week. Kenneth 
usually woke between 11:00 a.m. and noon. When Marianna returned home with 
Sean in the evenings Kenneth would be either locked in his office writing, or 
exercising which he did every day between 6:00-7:30. Kenneth's routine consisted 
of walking on his treadmill, weight lifting, and walking around the house up and 
down the stairs rapidly. (TT PP. 430-431) 
Marianna had always encouraged Kenneth to work. Several years before the 
separation she encouraged him to work at least one or two quarters so that he could 
qualify for Social Security under his own account. Kenneth refused the advice, 
saying he was too busy writing fiction. (TT P. 480) Kenneth's decision to stay at 
home rather than earn an income cost the family a full yearly salary compounded 
over many years. (TT P. 552) Marianna ultimately determined not to press the 
issue further because of his previous physical abuse in response to criticism. (TT P. 
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448-450) 
At trial Kenneth acknowledged that he had not been employed since the 
home had been completed in 1990. Since 1988 he had stayed home to write 
fiction. (TT P.247) He had penned 20 short stories and a novel, but had never 
published anything. (TT P. 247-248) 
The parties separated in December 2003 and the case was tried in August 
2005. Yet Kenneth testified that for those eighteen months he had made no effort to 
seek employment until just before trial. (TT PP. 179 & 257-260) Kenneth agreed 
with the vocational expert who testified that there had been many jobs in the 
construction industry during this time, but he had not applied for any of them. (TT 
P. 275) 
Kenneth's position at trial was that he was entitled to return to school to 
obtain his Ph.D. while receiving alimony from Marianne. Kenneth testified he was 
enrolled at the University of Utah with a Film Studies major and a History minor. 
Kenneth stated that his long-term plan was to obtain a Ph.D. Film Studies, his 
chosen field. Kenneth estimated that it would take him 214 years to complete his 
B.A. He would be of 56 years old at that time. (TT P. 281 -293) Kenneth 
optimistically estimated that it would take five additional years for him to complete 
a Ph.D., making him at least 61 years old when school ended. (TT P. 141-142 & 
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195-196) Kenneth testified that upon receiving his Ph.D. in Film Studies at the age 
of 61, he did not know what career opportunities to expect (TT P. 292) but thought 
that his income would be somewhere between $25,000 to $40,000 per year. (TT P. 
142) 
The trial court received the testimony and a written report of Dr. Kristy 
Farnsworth relative to Kenneth's employability and expected earnings. (Appellant's 
Addendum H-l; Trial Exhibit R-l) Dr. Farnsworth's credentials included 15 years 
of experience in evaluating individuals and their potential for employment (TT P.2), 
and she identified that she had testified as an expert 30-40 times in the past four 
years. (TT P.4) Dr. Farnsworth based her study on certain assumptions including 
Kenneth's education and the work he had performed in the past (TT P.5-6), 
Kenneth's resume (TT P.6-9) and the fact that he identified himself as having expert 
proficiency in Spanish and English. (TT P.32) Kenneth admitted that with practice 
he could use Spanish in a workplace setting. (TT P.370) Dr. Farnsworth expressly 
stated that currently Kenneth's Spanish language proficiency would be viewed as a 
very valuable skill for a construction supervisor to have. 
Dr. Farnsworth also accepted Kenneth's self-represented status as a former 
"independent general contractor" on his Home Depot job application, and his 
representations that he had trained in the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
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Joiners, first in their apprenticeship program and then as a journeyman carpenter. 
Kenneth agreed that he had identified his previous employment as "Independent 
General Contractor" at $25 per hour on his July 11, 2005 application to Home 
Depot. (Trial Exhibit P-18A) Kenneth agreed that his Home Depot application 
stated he worked as a carpenter in San Antonio for $15 per hour 27 years ago. He 
also agreed that he had been a journeyman carpenter and an independent contractor. 
(TTP.264-265) 
Dr. Farnsworth adopted further assumptions that Kenneth had a high school 
diploma, had completed a vocational training program in carpentry, completed one 
or two semesters of college, and was currently enrolled in college. (TT P.7) Dr. 
Farnsworth also made the assumption that Kenneth had a license in the past as a 
general contractor in the State of Utah and a journeyman's certificate in carpentry in 
the State of Texas. (TT P.8) 
Dr. Farnsworth performed a skills assessment based on the foregoing 
assumptions concerning Kenneth's education, certification and work history and she 
determined that he had the following skills: 1) basic skills and abilities of 
specialized knowledge in building and construction; 2) specialized mechanical 
knowledge regarding the tools, the machines and equipment used in building 
construction; 3) specialized knowledge of materials used in building construction; 
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4) specialized knowledge of the methods used to actually construct the structures; 
5) specialized knowledge of the chronological management of a construction 
project; 6) specialized knowledge of the principles of building design; 7) 
specialized knowledge of blueprints and drawings; 8) the management of financial 
resources; and 9) other, more general skills which he had demonstrated including 
information ordering, manual dexterity, finger dexterity, space and form perception 
and general intelligence. (TT P. 7-10) 
Based upon her study, Dr. Farnsworth identified several jobs available to 
Kenneth given his training, work history and skills which consisted of: 1) first-line 
supervisor or manager of construction-trade workers; 2) carpenter; 3) cost 
estimator; 4) cabinet maker or bench carpenter, both of whom work inside, not on-
site; 5) construction manager. In addition, she identified two other jobs that were 
readily available to people with no skills or training but with basic knowledge of 
computers either as a customer service representative or a computer support 
specialist. (TTP.10-11) 
Given Kenneth's potential jobs, Dr. Farnsworth then determined what the 
scale of pay or income would be for the available jobs based on figures published 
by the Department of Workforce Services compiled from quarterly reports received 
from employers. (TT P. 11-12) The entry-level wage for a manager of construction-
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trade workers was $15.80 per hour. The average wage was $21.90 an hour. No 
specific training or experience was required for such position. Cabinetmakers or 
bench carpenters had an entry wage of $8.80 per hour and an average wage of 
$11.80 per hour. No specific training or experience was required for such positions. 
Customer service representatives' entry-level wage is $9.10 an hour with an 
average wage of $12.00 an hour. Computer support specialists' entry-level wage 
was $9.50 an hour and an average wage of $14.90 an hour and up. First-line 
construction supervisors' annual entry wage would be from $32,864 to $45,000, 
depending on negotiations with an employer. A finish carpenters or bench 
carpenters entry wage would be $24,336 up to $33,696. In her view Kenneth's 
work experience placed him at least at the middle of that expected range. Dr. 
Farnsworth was careful to point out that the figures cited were expected wages to 
start employment, and that incremental raises would be expected. The customer 
service representatives' entry-level annual wage was $19,760, but individuals in 
that occupation moved up quickly in salary and had a lot of opportunities to obtain 
management positions. Dr. Farnsworth explained that a year is a conservative 
estimate of the length of time that wages in jobs such as those available to Kenneth 
would progress from entry level to average level, and her estimates were based on 
job ads and publications from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. (TT P.10-15) Dr. 
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Farnsworth stated that in her view a 54-year old carpenter would be employable as 
a lead man or foreman, finish carpenter, cabinetmaker, or bench carpenter. All of 
these positions pay more than construction laborers, who must have more stamina 
and agility in climbing structures. Dr. Farnsworth estimated that finding a job in 
one of the occupations she believed Kenneth was capable of would probably take 
no more than 30-45 days if concerted effort was made. Kenneth could have 
probably got a customer service or computer specialist job "that day." (TT P.56) 
At the time of trial the rate of unemployment in the State of Utah was only 4.7 
percent according to the United State Department of Labor Statistics. (TT P.55) 
Dr. Farnsworth concluded by testifying that to start Kenneth could make an annual 
income of at least $32,864, and as much $45,000. (TT P. 19) 
At trial Kenneth suggested that he was medically unable to work in the 
construction trades because of periodic ocular migraine headaches and a reaction to 
his medication, but under oath he admitted there was no medical evidence to 
support that contention. On cross, Kenneth admitted that he had never been rated as 
having a disability (other than his leg injury in the army) and that he had no medical 
testimony to establish his medical restrictions for work. (TT P. 278) Kenneth 
admitted that he had done a number of house repairs in the summer just before trial 
such as servicing the swamp cooler on his roof, repairing his fence, and repairing 
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the rain gutter that required him to climb ladders, maintain heights and do carpentry 
work. (TT P.283-286) Kenneth admitted that he had a treadmill at home that he 
used regularly. (TT P.326-327) Marianna also testified that while living together 
Kenneth had a weight set at home and had worked out from 6:00-7:30 every 
evening by using the treadmill, his weight bench and walking around rapidly. (TT 
P.431) Marianna described Kenneth's medical condition as good, not interfering 
with his everyday life. (TT P. 432-433) Kenneth also testified that since the parties' 
separation he had obtained a membership to Bali's Health Club. (TT P.326) 
Kenneth also testified that he had been receiving passive income from his 
pre-marital land investments, which totaled at least $1,500 the year before. (TT 
P.324) 
Kenneth also testified that during the marriage he garnered additional passive 
income of at least $18,000 per year working with the parties' joint stock account, 
and as part of the property settlement he would be awarded more than half of these 
funds in the mount of roughly $85,000. (TT P.240) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. Kenneth's brief includes facts and argument that were not presented to 
the trial court in his motion for new trial and therefore the new 
materials should not be considered. The trial court adopted the proper 
legal standard when considering his motion for new trial predicated 
upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The record reflects that there 
were no irregularities, accidents or surprises at trial that resulted in a 
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manifest injustice. While Kenneth asserted that trial counsel should 
have presented certain medical evidence at trial, he failed to show that 
counsel was at fault, that any such evidence indeed existed, or that if 
presented it would have resulted in a different decision. 
II. Kenneth's argument referring to a denial of due process and equal 
protection of the is completely unsupported by any fact, record or law 
except a general reference to the United States Constitution. Kenneth 
admits that this argument cannot result in appellate relief absent a 
record, and Marianna should be awarded fees incurred to defend. 
III. The trial court's findings are consistent with the evidence that Kenneth 
can earn $2,600, per month as gross income, has monthly needs of 
$2,500, but has additional income from independent land investments 
and investment in securities to pay any taxes required. 
IV. The trial court did not recognize a monthly need to fund a post-divorce 
savings / retirement account as among Kenneth's expenses because he 
presented no evidence of such an expense, and besides this type of 
expense is extraordinary. 
V. The trial court was offered only one version of Kenneth's monthly 
living expenses, and had no information presented to determine 
whether the standard of living presented therein was pre-separation, 
post-separation or otherwise. 
VI. Kenneth's position that the trial court should have simply equalized the 
parties' respective incomes is contrary to the law which requires 
considering his ability to earn and his reasonable monthly expenses. 
Alimony is not warranted if his needs are met. 
VII. The trial court may or may not chose to consider whether to adjust 
alimony in consideration of great enhancement to earnings during 
marriage, but the record establishes there were no remarkable efforts in 
this case. 
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VIII. Based upon a vocational study, and Kenneth's ability to work, the 
record establishes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that Kenneth had the ability to earn $32,000 per year. 
Kenneth's assertion that the decree is based upon sexual prejudice is 
unsupported by any fact, record or law, and is entirely speculative. 
Marianna should be awarded fees incurred to defend. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate procedure provide a remedy for spurious 
appeals which includes costs, double costs and/or attorney's fees, and 
because at least two of Kenneth's arguments are without merit she 
should be awarded costs and fees to defend. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER LEGAL STANDARD 
IN CONSIDERING KENNETH'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, 
AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION 
A. SCOPE OF REVIEW 
Kenneth assails the trial court's decision denying his request for a new trial. 
In his brief Kenneth now raises issues, asserts facts and makes arguments never 
brought before the trial court. Below Kenneth argued that his counsel was 
ineffective in three ways, to wit: 1) by failing to submit medical testimony to 
support his contention that he could not work; 2) by failing to submit his medical 
records; and 3) by failing to obtain testimony from a vocational expert suggesting 
limitations on his ability to work. Review of the trial court's decision should be 




B. APPLICATION OF THE PROPER LAW 
Kenneth asserts that the trial court misapplied the law in denying his motion 
for a new trial generally, and also pursuant to Rule 59, U.R.C.P. However the trial 
court applied the proper legal standard in making its determination. In its minute 
entry the court expressly acknowledged its power to "grant Petitioner a new trial if 
persuaded that the proceedings (including the conduct of petitioner's counsel) had 
resulted in an 'injustice.'" (Appellant's Addendum A-9; File Index Page 638) 
Despite both parties' memoranda which failed to identify the appropriate case law at 
the time, it is clear by the language of its ruling the trial court recognized and 
properly applied its power to grant a new trial upon a showing of exigent or 
exceptional circumstances which might appear to have resulted in an injustice. 
Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1982); accord Marchandv, Marchand, 
2006 UT App 429, | 21 ; 147 P.2d 538 However mere differences in the theory of 
trial techniques are not sufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial and the 
moving party must demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict 
would have been different. Marchand, id. f l7 
In his motion for new trial Kenneth argued that the trial court should have 
strictly adopted the standard used to assess ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
in criminal cases as identified beginning with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
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668. The trial court declined to apply the Strickland standard, adopting the 
Jennings view instead. This position is consistent with Utah law - no Utah 
appellate case has ever applied the criminal standard of review for ineffective 
counsel to a civil case. 
For the foregoing reasons the trial court did not err in its application of the 
law to this issue, and its denial of Kenneth's motion for new trial on that basis 
should be affirmed. 
C. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Kenneth argued below that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his lawyer failed to present certain 
evidence, to wit: 1) medical testimony to support his contention that he could not 
work; 2) his medical records; and 3) testimony from a vocational expert suggesting 
limitations on his ability to work. His brief raises several other complaints but 
these were not presented to the trial court. 
In considering the motion (Appellee's Addendum A) the trial court evaluated 
Kenneth's claims pursuant to Rule 59, U.R.C.P. The trial court expressly found 
that Kenneth failed to meet his burden to show that any such evidence existed, that 
it could have been presented at trial or that the decision would have been different 
had the court received such evidence. Kenneth has failed to marshal the evidence. 
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However Marianna's review of the record as discussed hereafter establishes that the 
clear weight of the evidence favors the court's findings. 
Rule 59, U.R.C.P, provides in relevant part as follows: 
Rule 59. New trials; amendment of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of they parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and 
direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial;. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against; 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at trial. 
In each instance the moving party bears the burden to establish a factual or legal 
basis for the relief requested. 
First, the evidence shows that there were no irregularities in the trial of this 
matter. The parties entered into a stipulation which limited the trial to essentially 
three issues, ie.: 1) fine-tuning a parent-time arrangement for the parties' child for 
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the next few months before majority; 2) whether Kenneth should receive 
reimbursement for a contribution to the marital residence from pre-marital funds; 
and 3) alimony for Kenneth. 
The trial was conducted for parts of four days and the vast majority of time 
and effort was spent on the issue of alimony. Kenneth was called and offered 
testimony for at least one-full day, which included his medical complaints, 
diagnoses and history. (TT P. 158-165; 183-184) Kenneth introduced twenty-three 
exhibits in support of his cause, and his trial counsel vigorously cross-examined 
Marianna and her two witnesses. 
Second, there were no accidents or surprises at trial. The emails attached to 
Kenneth's pleadings in support of the motion indicate that he was very proactive in 
the analysis and preparation of his case for trial. These documents establish that for 
many months he had anticipated that his medical condition would be an issue (File 
Index Pages 558, 564, 584), and that a vocational expert might be useful (File Index 
Pages 559, 590) This email traffic established that Kenneth's personal physician 
met with him in March five months before trial, and that thereafter his physician 
was in fact subpoened by counsel for trial and his medical records requested 
(Appellee's Addendum B; File Index Page 426), but his physician refused to render 
an opinion as to whether Kenneth was malingering, and indeed thought him 
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employable. (Appellant's Addendum A-5; File Index Page 594) More email 
provided to the trial court established that Kenneth failed to provide his attorney 
with the names of any other healthcare providers to advance his claim. (Appellant's 
Addendum A-5; File Index Page 594) The email also established that counsel 
discussed with Kenneth the limitations of his claim of medical incapacity because 
he had never been certified as disabled or applied for Social Security disability 
benefits (Appellant's Addendum A-5; File Index Page 595), and she pointed out to 
him that arguing his claim of disability could indeed impact on the safety of his son 
while with him. (Appellant's Addendum A-5; File Index Page 595) Trial counsel 
seemingly exercised her judgment in designing a strategy to harmonize the 
conflicting concerns presented by his alleged medical problems, to wit: Kenneth's 
limitations on working versus his fitness as a parent. Further, the email established 
that counsel provided Kenneth with the name of a vocational counselor to consult 
with, (Appellee's Addendum C; File Index Page 592) but he apparently chose not to 
do so. 
To prevail on appeal Kenneth must establish that the trial court abused its 
discretion in making the findings supporting denial of his motion. Marchand, id. 
In his motion for new trial Kenneth wholly failed to establish that any irregularity, 
accident or surprise had occurred, that new evidence existed, or that any such 
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evidence would have had an effect on the court's decision. Not only did Kenneth 
fail to meet his burden to establish a basis to grant him a new trial, but the clear 
weight of the evidence in the record support's the trial court's findings. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion, and its decision below denying the motion for 
new trial should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
KENNETH'S ARGUMENT RAISING ISSUES OF DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW AND IS 
WITHOUT MERIT, AND MARIANNA SHOULD BE GRANTED AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED TO RESPOND 
By his statement identifying issues for review and the argument heading in 
his Point II, Kenneth apparently asserts that he was denied due process of law and 
equal protection under the law in the matter below. However, Kenneth provides the 
Court with no facts, no record and no law except by general reference to support his 
challenge of error in the trial court, nor does he otherwise raise an issue that can be 
sustainable on appeal. The body of his unsupported argument appears to assail the 
local legal community for not sharing his views on the subject of alimony. 
Tellingly, in his argument Kenneth admits that it is impossible for this Court to 
provide relief on the issue he has framed. 
Rule 33(b), Utah R. App. P, provides that a frivolous brief is one that is not 
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grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law or not based upon a good faith 
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. Rule 33(c)(1), Utah R. App. P, 
provides that a party may request damages under this rule as part of appellee's brief 
For the foregoing reasons the trial court should be affirmed and Marianna is 
entitled to an award of her attorney's fees incurred to respond to the issues 
presented by this argument as discussed in Argument X hereafter. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT 
KENNETH HAD THE ABILITY TO MEET HIS MONTHLY NEEDS 
WITHOUT ALIMONY 
In his Point III Kenneth states: "That the trial court erred in determining 
Appellant's financial need by failing to make any allowance for taxes, including 
Federal income and Social Security taxes, and Utah state income taxes." 
The text of Kenneth's Point III suggests two errors. First, Kenneth argues that 
comparing the trial court's finding that he could earn $2,666 per month with his 
need for $2,500 per month, he was left lacking because no allowance was made to 
pay income taxes. Second, Kenneth's Point III also challenged the trial court for 
failing to make "an allowance for ownership costs of an automobile, for major 
purchases such as appliances and furniture, or remotely adequate allowances for 
clothing or travel." 
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As a condition precedent to challenging a fact and arguing abuse of 
discretion, Kenneth must first marshal the evidence, which he has failed to do. 
"When challenging a trial courtfs findings, an appellant must marshal the evidence 
in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Dibble v. 
Dibble (2003 UT App 230, |14) Kenneth has failed to meet this burden because he 
has failed to provide any such evidence from the record. Moreover, on appeal the 
reviewing court draws the facts from the trial court's findings, from its 
memorandum decision and from the record. Cox v. Cox, 1994 UT 16271, f 13; 877 
P.2d 1262 Where a trial court has considered the three alimony factors and has 
supported its rulings with adequate findings based upon sufficient evidence, the 
appellate court will not disturb its determination unless it has clearly abused its 
discretion. Cox, id. f 39 Alimony determinations are within the sound discretion of 
the trial court because of its advantaged position to assess evidence and ascertain 
facts. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997), citing Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 
at 913 (Utah 1978) 
The trial court made the following relevant findings: (Appellant's addendum 
K; File Pages 529-532): 
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(b) Petitioner receives a small income from his 
independent land investments. 
(c) Petitioner receives a small income from his security 
investments. 
Upon the testimony and evidence adduced by Petitioner 
and Respondent at trial and upon the testimony of Dr. 
Kristy Farnsworth, the Court finds employment is 
available to Petitioner at the rate of $32,000 per year. 
The Court finds Petitioner to have reasonable monthly 
need in the amount of $2,500. 
Upon the foregoing, the Court finds by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Petitioner is able to support himself 
and to enjoy gross annual income of $32,000, or gross 
monthly income of $2,666. Accordingly, the Court finds 
petitioner is able to meet his own monthly needs and 
therefore an award of permanent alimony is not 
warranted. 
Kenneth's first argument identifies only the earned income attributed to him 
by the trial court at the gross rate of $2,666 per month. Kenneth argues that after 
taxes he would not have enough to meet his needs of $2,500 per month, and thus 
the trial court's decision must be in error. However his argument ignores the trial 
court's express findings that Kenneth had additional income with which to either 
pay taxes, meet needs or both. 
The evidence presented at trial established that in addition to the imputed 







totaled at least $1,500 the year before. The evidence also established that based 
upon his previous investment practices and successes, Kenneth had enjoyed 
additional passive income of at least $18,000 per year working with the parties' 
joint stock account and that as part of the property settlement he would be awarded 
more than half of the remaining funds, roughly $85,000. (TT P.240) The record 
fully supports the trial court's findings that Kenneth had additional income with 
which to pay taxes or otherwise meet needs and the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in making this finding. 
Kenneth next assails the trial court for failing to recognize monthly expenses 
for "ownership costs of an automobile, for major purchases such as appliances and 
furniture, or remotely adequate allowances for clothing or travel." Concerning the 
first category, "ownership costs of an automobile, and money for major purchases 
such as appliances and furniture", Kenneth fails to disclose that the trial court was 
never presented specific evidence regarding these expenses. The record establishes 
that Kenneth was called to testify regarding his monthly needs and that he offered 
an exhibit to support his claim for a monthly budget (Appellant's Addendum C-2; 
Exhibit P-15). The trial court accepted this exhibit into evidence for the sake of 
establishing Kenneth's self-described expenses, but neither by testimony nor further 
exhibit did Kenneth offer additional evidence related to automobile purchases, 
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major appliance purchases, or furniture expenses. Kenneth expressly identified his 
costs of owning an automobile as auto expense (gas/repairs & maintenance) at $280 
per month on the exhibit. Kenneth's exhibit did have an entry for "auto payments'1 
but he chose to list no such expense. There were no express entries for appliances 
or furniture per se, but Kenneth's list did include a "catchall" expense entitled Misc. 
Cash Expenses in the amount of $85.00 for which no explanation was offered. In 
his brief Kenneth now seeks to have the appellate court consider his costs for 
purchasing a car that were never presented to the court below. 
The Court stated in Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997): 
"In domestic relations cases the parties commonly submit statements of 
assets and expenses as exhibits. Trial courts also commonly accept into 
evidence exhibits constituting that party's claims without objection. 
However, this procedure does not necessarily obviate the need for further 
evidence in support of some items listed on the exhibit. Generally there is 
further questioning of certain items contained in the exhibits as to value. 
Trial judges commonly accept, modify, reduce or reject claimed items in such 
exhibits, depending on the item and according to the evidence or the lack 
thereof. . . . . The trial court is not required to accept each item of expense as 
a proven fact just because it receives a statement of expenses into evidence." 
The trial court found that Kenneth failed to credibly establish monthly living 
expenses above $2,500, and the record evidence sustains that finding which should 
not now be disturbed. Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
With respect to the clothing and travel expenses, once again Kenneth 
presented his evidence in the form of his exhibit, which expressly identified his 
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stated monthly expenses for clothing and travel. No other evidence was offered to 
the trial court regarding clothing or travel Kenneth could not reasonably expect the 
court to make any contrary finding as to these expenses. 
In sum, Kenneth has failed to marshal the evidence to support a claim that the 
trial court abused its discretion. Moreover the evidence once marshaled establishes 
that the trial court was informed of and considered Kenneth's monthly expenses as 
he presented them. The trial court could not have made a finding on an expense 
never placed in evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and its 
decision below should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO SPECIFY A POST-DIVORCE SAVINGS / RETIREMENT ACCOUNT 
AMONG KENNETH'S NEEDS 
Kenneth asserts that the trial court erred because it did not expressly award 
him additional funds to support a post-divorce retirement account. His argument 
fails for several reasons. 
First, a recipient spouse's need to fund a post-divorce savings, investment, or 
retirement account may not ordinarily be factored into alimony determinations. 
Bakanowski v. Backanowski, 80 P.3d 153, 2003 UT App 357, 485 Utah Adv. Rep 
28 Indeed, a trial court can only include these funds in a needs analysis when they 
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are necessary, and only after making detailed findings based upon the evidence 
presented at trial. Bakanowski, id. However, no specific evidence was offered to 
the trial court below to support such a finding and thus there can be no error or 
abuse of discretion in that regard. It is no abuse of discretion for a trial court to not 
consider issues not presented below. Owen v, Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986) 
As previously noted, at trial Kenneth provided testimony regarding his 
monthly needs and he offered an exhibit to support his claim for a monthly budget 
of his necessary expenses. Kenneth did comment on a general concern regarding 
his future retirement, but he offered no testimonial or documentary evidence related 
to a specific retirement plan, or to his specific needs. The list of need presented by 
Kenneth's contained no entry for a retirement savings account. Having no specific 
evidence before it, Kenneth could not expect the trial court to make a finding and 
then award him funds for this purpose. 
In addition, the trial court received and approved the parties1 stipulation, and 
thereafter made a finding that Kenneth was awarded the marital residence without 
any encumbrance, Kenneth was awarded $80,000 in a stock account, and that 
Kenneth was awarded one-half of the residual portion of Marianne's TIAA/Cref 
retirement account after deducting the value of the home. Indeed, Kenneth's future 
was made quite secure by the parties' stipulated property division. 
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In sum, because Kenneth presented no specific evidence to support what 
would be an extraordinary finding that a retirement account was necessary, and 
because the record establishes that Kenneth's future was financially secure, the trial 
court did not err when it failed to consider additional funding for a retirement 
account in evaluating Kenneth's claim for alimony. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE ONLY EVIDENCE 
OFFERED TO SUPPORT KENNETH'S NEED FOR ALIMONY, AND HAD 
NO BASIS TO DETERMINE ANY OTHER "STANDARD OF LIVING" 
NOT IN EVIDENCE 
In his Point V Kenneth asserts that the trial court gave no consideration to the 
standard of living during the marriage in determining his needs, and made no 
finding why it failed to do so. However as stated in the foregoing argument the trial 
court received and carefully considered all testimony and documentary evidence 
Kenneth submitted regarding his monthly needs. On appeal Kenneth now faults the 
trial court for somehow failing to ascertain another unspecified, "higher1' standard 
of need wholly unsupported by the record below. 
The trial court made the following relevant findings: 
47. The Court finds Petitioner's financial needs are more 
problematic to articulate and the Court must take into 
account the parties1 "standard of living.11 
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51. The Court must evaluate Petitioner's "ongoing" expenses 
in order to properly evaluate his "standard of living" 
which expenses include Petitioner's monthly and ongoing 
insurance, food, clothing, and entertainment expenses and 
the like. 
In arriving at the above findings, the trial court received Kenneth's self-prepared list 
offered as illustrative of his testimony. (Appellant's Addendum C-2; Trial Exhibit 
P-15) This was the only specific evidence offered related to Kenneth's needs. The 
trial court had no other factual basis by which to ascertain any other "standard of 
living" to identifying his needs, however designated. 
The record of this action establishes that from time to time Kenneth 
represented his monthly needs to the court, each time to support a claim for 
alimony. Each time his stated needs increased. His stated monthly budget as 
identified by his first counsel was listed at $2,771.00. (See Appellee's Addendum 
D; Trial Exhibit R-27) His stated monthly budget as identified by his second 
counsel was $2,588.33. (See Appellee's Addendum E) By the time he retained his 
third counsel for mediation, Kenneth's stated monthly needs had increased to 
$4,782. (See Appellee's Addendum F; Trial Exhibit R-25) By trial Kenneth's 
monthly needs had increased to $4,800.00 per month (Appellant's Addendum C-2; 
Trial Exhibit 15) Kenneth claimed all of this was needed for alimony despite 
having no mortgage or rent payment. 
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It is clear from the record that Kenneth had ample opportunity to develop his 
trial position regarding monthly expenses, and that at trial he was afforded that 
opportunity. Kenneth submitted his list, but then never provided further evidence 
of monthly needs. The trial court without a basis to consider any alternate standard 
of living. 
In sum, Kenneth has failed to marshal the evidence to support a claim that the 
trial court abused its discretion. Moreover the evidence, once marshaled, 
establishes that the trial court was informed of and considered Kenneth's monthly 
expenses as he presented them. The trial court could not have made a finding on 
any alternate standard of living as no evidence thereof was ever received. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion and its decision below should be affirmed. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY FAILING TO "EQUALIZE INCOME" 
In Point VI of his brief Kenneth argues: "That the trial court erred by failing 
to give any consideration to equalizing the parties1 standards of living after divorce 
and failed to make any finding as to the parties1 standard of living during marriage." 
UCA §30-3-5(8)(d) provides: "The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties1 respective standards of living." The court's authority 
is discretionary, and this case presents no such circumstances. 
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Kenneth's discussion of this issue becomes an argument for simple income 
equalization. However the trial court rejected Kenneth's argument for income 
equalization below for good reason. Alimony should never be calculated upon a 
theory of simple income equalization. To do so would constitute an abuse of 
discretion and reversible error. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, f29; 
80 P.3d 153 In fact, a trial court cannot award a party more than their established 
needs require, regardless of the other party's ability to pay an excess amount. 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah App. Ct. 1994) If a party is 
capable of meeting their own determined needs, no alimony should be awarded. 
Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, f 19 Adopting a simple income-equalization 
approach would have violated the requirement that trial courts exercise their 
discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts. Haumont v. Haumont, 
793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
Moreover, as noted in the previous argument Kenneth provided the trial court 
with only one account of his monthly needs, which the court accepted before paring 
down certain listed items. Kenneth has not objected to the manner in which the 
court made adjustments to his version of expenses in this appeal. 
For these reasons Kenneth's arguments that income-equalization should have 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY FAILING TO FIND THAT KENNETH "GREATLY ENHANCED" 
MARIANNE'S EARNING CAPACITY 
In Point VII of his brief Kenneth argues that the trial court "made no 
adjustment to its award of property, or its failure to award alimony, in consideration 
of the great enhancement of Ms. DiPaolo's earning capacity through the efforts of 
both parties during the marriage." 
UCA §30-3-5(8)(e) provides: "If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court 
may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony." This authority is discretionary, and once again Kenneth has failed to 
fully marshal the evidence required to assail the Court's findings. 
First, the parties entered into a plenary stipulation that resolved all aspects of 
property division, so the trial court could have committed no error the division of 
property under this argument. 
Second, Marianna had completed a B.A. at the University of Colorado 
supported by her parents, scholarships, student loans and working before the parties 
met. Marianna had also completed several years of graduate work supported by 
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Work Study jobs, Teaching Assistantships, Research Assistantships, and 
fellowships before the parties met. Marianna had completed the coursework 
required for her Ph.D. program of study before the parties met, and these 
accomplishments are the foundation of her academic career. Before applying for 
her job at the University of Utah, Marianna had already published some articles. It 
was four years before marriage when Marianna received her academic appointment 
and moved to Utah in 1982. By this time Marianna had also completed a good part 
of the work for her dissertation. Ultimately Kenneth provided Marianna with very 
little assistance on completing her Ph.D. dissertation. 
Kenneth did help with the research for one article under Mariannafs 
supervision, and helped with a reading passage for another article but other paid 
research assistants also helped. 
Sixteen years before trial Kenneth did provide some assistance to an attorney 
hired by Marianna to appeal her tenure review, but she also assisted with the appeal 
process while she continued to work full-time. Kenneth was in some ways a 
detriment to Mariannafs career. 
After Kenneth finished the family home he never sought or obtained 
employment, nor has he earned any income to assist in support of the family. Since 
1988 he simply chose to stay home and write fiction. He has never been published 
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nor has his writing led to any income. 
Kenneth has not demonstrated any particular devotion to care-taking the 
family. Marianna was an equal caretaker for Sean in the first year of his life, and 
although she worked full-time Marianna continued her exclusive scare-taking duties 
every evening after work, as well as every weekend. Despite not working, Kenneth 
placed their pre-school son Sean in childcare so that he could pursue his personal 
interests. Kenneth often neglected his household duties. By the time of the parties' 
separation, Marianna had assumed the biggest share of caring for the family, and 
Kenneth did not usually wake up until 11:00 a.m. or noon. Kenneth usually be 
found either locked in his office writing or exercising which he did every day. 
As noted, the terms of UCA §30-3-5(e) enabling a trial court to consider a 
spouse's potentially enhanced earning capacity are discretionary not compulsory. 
The weight of the marshaled evidence reflects that Marianna's career was developed 
primarily before marriage, and overall Kenneth spent little time and made few 
sacrifices in assisting her. Kenneth instead chose a path of staying home and 
indulging in the pursuits that interested him without providing the family with any 
financial support. Further, by placing the pre-school child in daycare despite his the 
ability to care for him, and by generally sharing the physical care of the child and 
the burdens of household with Marianna, by no means did Kenneth suffer or 
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sacrifice such that the trial court should have felt compelled to consider his 
enrichment by compensatory alimony. 
Once marshaled the evidence establishes that the trial court acted well within 
its discretion in not finding it necessary to consider alimony as a means of 
rewarding Kenneth for his conduct during marriage, and its ruling below should be 
affirmed. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING THAT KENNETH HAD THE CAPACITY 
TO EARN $32,000 PER YEAR 
Kenneth asserts that the trial court "made an error of fact in finding that he 
can earn $32,000 per year when his average earning per year before marriage were 
$3,230." At the time of trial Kenneth was unemployed, and had been chronically 
unemployed for the duration of the marriage. Marianna testified that in her 
experience she certainly know that Kenneth could work, and that she had regularly 
requested him to work he but had consistently refused and even become abusive. 
To seek a review of this issue, Kenneth must fully marshal the evidence most 
favorable to the trial court's findings, which he has failed to do. 
The trial court made the following specific Findings of Fact (Appellant's 
Addendum K): 
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a) 54. Based upon the testimony and evidence adduced by 
Petitioner and Respondent at trial and upon the testimony of Dr. 
Kristy Farnsworth, the Court finds employment is available to 
Petitioner at the rate of $32,000 per year. 
b) 55. The Court rejects Petitioner's testimony that his age 
prohibits him from earning income at this level. 
c) 56. The court rejects Petitioner's claim that his health, which 
includes ocular migraines and adverse medication reactions, 
renders Petitioner unemployable or unable to earn income at the 
rate of $32,000 per year. 
d) 57. The Court is not convinced the Petitioner's health 
problems adversely impact his ability to be employed. 
e) 58. The Court finds that Petitioner is underemployed and that 
he possesses the ability to produce an income for his own self-
support. 
f) 59. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner is able to support 
himself and to enjoy gross annual income of $32,000, or gross 
monthly income of $2,666. Accordingly, the Court finds, 
Petitioner is able to meet his own monthly needs and therefore 
an award of permanent alimony is not warranted. 
g) 60. The Court declines to award Petitioner any sum in and for 
rehabilitative alimony. 
h) 61. The Court also finds upon the testimony of Dr. 
Farnsworth, Petitioner may experience a transition period of up 
to 90 days before he is able to realize income equaling to 
$32,000 per year. 
i) 62. However, the Court finds that given the fact that 
Petitioner has been awarded cash in the amount of $85,000 and 
a home valued at $176,500, Petitioner has sufficient assets to 
draw upon and therefore declines to award Petitioner any time 
as a transition period. 
j) 63. Accordingly, no alimony is awarded Petitioner. 
The trial court received the testimony and written report of Dr. Kristy 
Farnsworth. Dr. Farnsworth based her study on certain assumptions including 
Kenneth's education and the work he had performed in the past, his resume and his 
Spanish language skills which would be a valuable commodity for a construction 
supervisor. Dr. Farnsworth also acknowledged Kenneth as a former independent 
general contractor, and acknowledged his training in the United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners apprenticeship program, with ultimate journeyman carpenter 
status. She accepted his statements that in previous employment he had earned $25 
per hour as a general contractor and $15 per hour as a union carpenter 27 years ago. 
Dr. Farnsworth evaluated Kenneth's skills and determined that he could 
obtain employment either as a first-line supervisor or manager of construction-trade 
workers, a carpenter, a cost estimator, a cabinet maker or bench carpenter, a 
construction manager or as either as a customer service representative or a 
computer support specialist which required no special training. Dr. Farnsworth 
then determined what income would be expected given these positions at mere 
entry levels, which ranged from $15.80 to $21.90 an hour for the construction 
management positions. First-line construction supervisors' entry wage would be 
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from $32,864 to $45,000, and finish carpenter or bench carpenter entry wage would 
be from $24,336 to $33,696. Dr. Farnsworth stated that in her view a 54-year old 
carpenter would be employable as a lead man or foreman, finish carpenter, 
cabinetmaker, or bench carpenter, and all of these positions paid more than 
construction laborers, who must have more stamina and agility in climbing 
structures. 
Kenneth's suggestion that his medical condition prohibited him from working 
was fully discounted by the Court and should not have been considered by Dr. 
Farnsworth. Kenneth admitted that he had never been rated as having a disability 
(other than his leg injury in the army) and that he had no medical testimony to 
establish his medical restrictions for work. Kenneth admitted that he had done a 
number of house repairs in the summer of 2005 such as servicing the swamp cooler 
of his roof, repairing his fence, and repairing the rain gutter that required him to 
climb ladders, maintain heights and do carpentry work. Kenneth admitted that he 
had a treadmill at home that he used, and Marianna testified that while living 
together Kenneth had a weight set at home and had worked out from 6:00-7:30 
every evening by using the treadmill, his weight bench and walking around rapidly. 
Finally, Kenneth testified that since the parties1 separation he had obtained a 
membership to a fitness center and had applied for several jobs, belying his inability 
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to work. 
In his brief Kenneth improperly refers to facts and makes arguments related 
to evidence that was not admitted at trial. Accordingly his Addenda A-7 and F-l 
have no place in his brief. It is disingenuous for Kenneth, who apparently has the 
skills to research and write his legal brief on appeal, to suggest that his historical 
income of $3,230 per year ($269 per month) has relevance to his current ability to 
earn in the 21st century. Kenneth's statement that subsequent to trial he actually 
secured employment with Home Depot, inconsistent with his claim of medical 
disability, should also not be considered. Kenneth challenges Dr. Kristyfs study 
because she never met with him, but she testified that 30-40 time each month she 
conducted employment analysis for the Social Security Administration without 
meeting subjects. (TT P.20) 
A trial court is entitled to impute income for purposes of calculating alimony. 
Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) The evidence, once fully 
marshaled, establishes that the trial court acted well within its discretion in finding 
that Kenneth had the capacity to earn $32,000 per year, and its ruling below should 
be affirmed. 
POINT IX 
KENNETH'SASSERTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECREE IS 
BASED UPON ILLEGAL SEXUAL PREJUDICE IS WHOLLY 
UNSUPPORTED AND WITHOUT MERIT, AND MARIANNA SHOULD BE 
GRANTED AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED TO RESPOND 
In his Point VIII Kenneth broadly asserts that the trial court's ruling was 
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based upon illegal sexual prejudice. However, Kenneth provides the Court with no 
evidence on the record, nor any reviewable facts to support his position and 
therefore his challenge to the trial court's decision on this theory must fail. 
Kenneth's argument is based merely upon speculation. 
Further, assuming arguendo that the trial court recognized that male individuals 
generally have better jobs and make more money, it would be fully appropriate and 
would not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution. See In re the Estate ofScheller, 783 P.2d 
70 (UtahApp. Ct. 1989) 
Rule 33(b), Utah R. App. P, provides that a frivolous brief is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law or not based upon a good faith 
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. Rule 33(c), Utah R. App. P, 
provides that a party may request damages under this rule as part of appellee's brief. 
Kenneth's brief is not based upon fact. 
For the foregoing reasons the trial court should be affirmed and Marianna 
should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred on appeal to respond to the issues 
presented by this argument. 
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POINT X 
MARIANNA SHOULD BE AWARDED THOSE ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL RELATED TO KENNETH'S DUE PROCESS, EQUAL 
PROTECTION & ILLEGAL SEXUAL PREJUDICE CLAIMS, TOGETHER 
WITH DOUBLE COSTS 
Before trial the parties stipulated that each would assume their respective 
attorney's fees incurred in the case below, so the typical rule related to fees on 
appeal does not apply. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, (Utah App. Ct. 1991) 
However, Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P provides as follows: 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking 
to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award, (emphasis 
added) 
Rule 33, Utah R. App. P provides in relevant part as follows: 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of 
attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for frivolous appeal Except in the first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion 
made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay , it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney's 
fees, to the prevailing party.. . . 
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of these rules, a frivolous 
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appeal, motion, brief or other paper is one that is not grounded 
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or is not based on a good 
faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. An 
appeal, motion brief, or other paper interposed for any improper 
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the 
appeal, motion brief, or other paper. 
The sanction for filing a frivolous appeal applies only in ":egregious" case with no 
"reasonable legal or factual basis.'1 Cooke v. Cooke, 22 P.2d 1249 2001 UT App 
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Marianna requests the appellate court to consider at least a partial award of 
her attorney's fees, and her costs on appeal. Kenneth presented no factual basis for 
the Court to properly consider his Issue 2 and Issue 9 as set forth in his brief. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Respondent/Appellee prays the Court to affirm the ruling of 
the trial court denying Petitioner / Appellant an award of alimony, for an award of 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in defense of all or parts of this appeal, and for 
such other and further relief as may be fair and proper in the premises. 
DATED this day of March, 2007. 
ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 2007,1 caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be served upon Appellant by 
first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
KENNETH C. RANSON 
2096 E. 10095 South 
Sandy, UT 84094 
ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY 
Attorney for Respondent /Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
KENNETH'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Kenneth C. Ranson 
2096 E. 10095 S. 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801/942-8047 
kennethranson @ earthlink. net 
F I L E D 
TH"R-Vnr,.,-r 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Petitioner, 
vs 
MARIANNA DI PAOLO 
Civil No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto Jr. 
Comm. T. Patrick Casey 
Respondent 
PETITIONER KENNETH C. RANSON, pro se, hereby moves the court for 
a new trial on the following grounds. 
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court caused by the incompetence of 
his counsel, Bridget K. Romano. Ms. Romano utterly failed to provide 
effective assistance of counsel as required by law. She failed to frame and 
document an affirmative case on his behalf in spite of repeated assurances 
that she would do so. Her behavior falls so far below objective standards of 
effective assistance of counsel that the results of the trial cannot be relied on 
as fair. That her behavior prejudiced Petitioner is established by the words 
of the court in its ruling. The court said from the bench that it did not have 
competent evidence on one point not documented by Ms. Romano, and 
found for Respondent on several other points by a preponderance of the 
evidence because of the lack of the very information Ms. Romano failed to 
present. An affidavit and evidence supporting these claims is attached. 
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For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request the Court to grant a new 
trial in this matter. 
DATED this 24th day of 
February, 2006. 
Kenneth Clark Ranson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 24th day of February, 2006, personally appeared before me 
Kenneth Clark Ranson, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
BEVERLEE GARCIA 
7220 So Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City Utah 84121 
My Commission Expires 
December 20 2006 
STATE OF UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of February, 2006,1 hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL to the 
following: 
Robert Devin Pusey 
140 West 9000 South, #7 
Sandy, UT 84070 





KENNETHS TRIAL SUBPOENA 
DUCES TECUM TO PHYSICIAN 
BRIDGET K. ROMANO (6979) 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Eighth Floor, Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P.O. Box 45561 







_ — / / r /c/ /2^" SC?,T 
rQ^ LEGAL PROCESS LLC 964-939, 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG - 4 2005 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By ML ^ L 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MARIANNA DI PAOLO, 
Respondent. 
SUBPOENA 
Civil No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
TO: Lewis J. Barton, M.D. 
24 South 1100 East ^ 3OS-
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801)364-1155 
YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
[X] to appear in the Third District Court at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case. 
[ ] to appear at the place, date, and time specified below to testify at the taking of a 
deposition in the above case. 
[X] to produce or permit inspection and copying of the following documents or 
objects at the place, date, and time specified below: 
[ ] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time specified 
below. 
Il-rl d^iSo V 
Scott M. Matheson Court House 
450 South State Street, Room N42, Salt Lake City, UT August 16 & 17, 2005 at 9:00 p.m. 
PLACE DATE AND TIME 
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED: ALL documents or tangible things in the possession, custody 
or control of Lewis J.Barton, M.D. pertaining to Kenneth C. Ranson. Said documents and 
tangible things shall include all writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, 
and other data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, 
through detection devices into reasonably usable form, pertaining to Kenneth C. Ranson, and 
shall include, but not be limited to, all medical records, medical charts, test results, list of 
prescription medications, documents showing Mr. Ranson's past conditions and current 
conditions, hospitalizations, disabilities, and other documents or tangible things pertaining to 
Kenneth C. Ranson. 
Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall 
designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to 
testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which the 
person will testify. Rule 30(b)(6), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
DATED this J_ day of August, 2005. 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
rET K. ROMANO 
s^ for Petitioner 
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NOTICE TO PERSONS SERVED WITH A SUBPOENA 
Subpoena to Appear at Trial, at Hearing, or at Deposition 
1. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at trial or at hearing, 
you must appear in person at the place designated in the subpoena. 
2. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at deposition, you 
must appear in person at the place designated in the subpoena. If you are a 
resident of Utah, the subpoena may command you to appear only in the county 
where you reside, or where you are employed, or where you transact business in 
person, or where the court orders you to appear. If you are not a resident of Utah, 
the subpoena may command you to appear only in the county where you are 
served with the subpoena, or where the court orders. 
3. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at trial, at hearing, or 
at deposition, but does not command you to produce or to permit inspection and 
copying of documents or tangible things, or inspection of premises, you have the 
right to object if the subpoena: 
a. imposes an undue burden or expense upon you; 
b. does not allow you a reasonable time to comply, which may be less than 
14 days, depending on the circumstances; or 
c. commands you to appear at deposition at a place in violation of paragraph 
2, above. 
4. To object to complying with the subpoena, you must file with the court issuing 
the subpoena a motion to quash or modify the subpoena. You must comply with 
the subpoena unless you have obtained a court order granting you relief from the 
subpoena. 
Subpoena to Produce or to Permit Inspection of Documents or Tangible Things or to Permit 
Inspection of Premises 
5. If this subpoena commands you to produce or to permit inspection and copying of 
documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, but does not 
command you to appear to give testimony at trial, at a hearing, or at a deposition: 
a. you need not appear in person at the place of production or inspection; 
b. you must produce documents as you keep them in the ordinary course of 
business or organize and label them to correspond with the categories 
demanded in the subpoena; and 
c. you need not make any copies or advance any costs for production, 
inspection or copying. If you agree to make copies, the party who has 
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served the subpoena upon you must pay the reasonable costs of production 
and copying. 
You have the right to object if the subpoena: 
a. imposes an undue burden or expense upon you; 
b. does not allow you at least 14 days to comply, unless the party serving the 
subpoena has obtained a court order requiring an earlier response; 
c. requires you to disclose a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development or commercial information; 
d. requires you to disclose privileged communication with your attorney or 
privileged trial preparation materials; or 
e. requires you to disclose an unretained expert's opinion or information not 
describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from 
expert's study made not at the request of any party. 
To object to a subpoena for one of the reasons stated in paragraph 6, you must 
provide notice in writing of your objection to the party or attorney serving the 
subpoena before the date specified in the subpoena for you to respond. If your 
objection is based on either paragraph 6(c), 6(d), or 6(e), your written objection 
must describe the nature of the documents, communications or things that you 
object to producing with sufficient specificity to enable the party or attorney 
serving the subpoena to contest your objection. You must also comply with the 
subpoena to the extent that it commands production or inspection of materials to 
which you do not object. 
After you make timely written objection, the party who has served the subpoena 
upon you must obtain a court order to compel you to comply with the subpoena. 
The party must give you a copy of its motion for a court order and notice of any 
hearing before the court. You have the right to file a response to the motion with 
the court and a right to attend any hearing. After you make a timely written 
objection, you have no obligation to comply with the subpoena until the party 
serving the subpoena has served you with a court order that compels you to 
comply. 
If this subpoena commands you to produce or to permit inspection and copying of 
documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, and to appear 
to give testimony at trial, at a hearing, or at a deposition, you may object to the 
production or inspection of documents or tangible things, or inspection of 
premises, by following the procedure identified in paragraph 7. Even though you 
object to production or inspection of documents or tangible things, or inspection 
of premises, you must appear in person at the trial, at the hearing or at the 
deposition unless you obtain an order of the court by following the procedures 
identified in paragraph 4. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUBPOENA to the 
following, postage prepaid, this _^_ day of August, 2005: 
Robert D. Pusey 
Attorney for Respondent 
140 West 9000 South, #7 












KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, & RICKS,L.L.C. 
50 W. BROADWAY #800 
S.L.C.,UT 84101 531-7090 
Case: 044900818 Civil# Doc# 
PlaintiffCs 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON 
VS Defendants 
MARIANNA DI PAOLO 
Process SUBPOENA and a check for $ 18.50 and a Letter 
To: LEWIS J BARTON, M.D. 
The undersigned Person Hereby Certifies: 
I am at the time of service a duly qualified and acting peace officer and or a person over2I years of age, and am not party to the action being 
taken. I have endorsed with the date, time and my signature on each copy served 
Title: Process Server and/or Private Investigator 
I Served: LEWIS J BARTON, M.D. 
Date: 8/02/2005 Time: 10:45 
Address. 24 SO. 1100 E. #305 S.L.C., UT 84102 
Phone: 364-1155 Work: 
Type of Service: Personally Served 
Todd Oram, Private Investigator 
Subscribedand Sworn Before Me JJHS >3rd Day of August 2005 
^ T ^ -









Total Due: $ 17.00 
My conyritsi 
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&i^K LINDA ALVEY 
W'i^L \ N0TARY PUBLIC - STATE Or UTAH 
ft W-:l C:j 5416 SO. COLLFEUM CT 
\<^>jr TAYLORSVILLE UT 84113 
v . ^ ^ My comm Exp. 03/07/7C07 
Comments: 
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ADDENDUM C 
KENNETHS TRIAL COUNSEL REFERS HIM TO 
VOCATIONAL EXPERT 
^/VJ7I'<W f / / / I / 
From: "Jody Jensen" <jjensen@klmrlaw.com> 
Subject: trial issues 
Date: July 29, 2005 10:06:53 AM MDT 
To: <kennethranson@earthlink.net> 
Cc: "Bridget Romano" <bromano@klmrlaw.com> 
Ken, 
Bridget is out of town today and will be back in the office on Monday. I checked her e-mails this morning 
and saw the two e-mails from you. You are welcome to come in this morning to review the documents in 
our office at any time. Please call before you come and I can make sure I have them available for you. I 
will also make copies of the documents you are requesting. 
I spoke with Bridget this morning about your e-mails. 
In Bridget's opinion she does not see the need for a vocational/employment counselor. You can discuss 
her reasons for this on Monday. However, if you feel this is something that you want to do, the name of the 
person she would use is Saara Grizzell, Vocational Consulting Solutions, Inc., 699 East South Temple, 
Ste. 220, Salt Lake City, UT 84102. Telephone 741-4207, fax 741-4249. You may contact her directly. 
I am in the process of preparing trial subpoenas for the University, Dr. Barton and Mr. Newman. Bridget is 
going to request their appearance at trial and to bring the appropriate documents. 
As a brief response to your concerns over the university materials and alimony, I read you e-mails to 
Bridget and she agrees that you and she do not agree on how your case should be presented. 
I have called the court and as of today your case is still a second place setting. The judge's clerk 
recommended that I call plaintiff's attorney in the first place setting case and try to determine the likelihood 
of them going to trial. I have left a message for the attorney to call me. 
Bridget feels that if your case does not go to trial on August 16 that you may want to discuss the possibility 
of seeking new counsel to represent you at trial. However, she does not know if the judge will allow her to 
withdraw at this point in the case. But if you do have other counsel to step in, the chances are greater he 
will grant that request. 
Bridget has a hearing Monday morning, but will be available Monday afternoon to discuss these issues 
with you in greater detail. 
Jody M. Jensen, CLA 
Certified Legal Assistant 
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC 
50 West Broadway, 8th Floor 





KENNETH'S MONTHLY STATEMENT OF NEEDS 
BY FIRST COUNSEL 
(RESPONDENT'S TRIAL EXHIBIT R-27) 
JARROD H. JENNINGS, #8431 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 801-328-1162 
Facsimile: 801-328-9565 
Third Judicial Otetrlc? 
FEB J 3 im 
SALT
 U p COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





VERIFIED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
RELIEF 
Civil No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
COMES NOW Petitioner, by and through counsel of record, Jarrod H. Jennings, 
Corporon and Williams, P.C, and moves the above-entitled Court for an Order of Temporary 
Relief. IN SUPPORT OF SAID MOTION, the Petitioner states as follows: 
1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action are husband and wife, having been married in October 
1984, in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
2. There has one child born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Sean Ranson, whose date 
of birth is December 2, 1987. Petitioner has been the primary caretaker of the minor child, 
providing security, comfort, attending to his daily needs, transporting him to and from school, 
and nurturing him and in all ways acting as the primary caretaker. Respondent has worked full-
time during the term of the marriage. Her employment as a professor at the University of Utah 
often finds her working 10+ hours per day. 
3. During the marriage the parties have acquired an interest in real property, 
commonly known as 2096 East 10095 South, Sandy, Utah 84092, and more particularly described 
as follows: 
"Lot 468 Park Crest # 4" 
Parcel No, 28-10-355-005 
4. Respondent is employed full-time as a professor at the University of Utah and 
earns, approximately $6,916.00 per month. 
5. The Petitioner is a homemaker and does not receive income. Petitioner has been 
the homemaker, and the primary care taker of the parties' minor child. 
6. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain items of personal 
property, as follows: 
DESCRIPTION 
Automobiles: 
2002 Subaru Outback 
1992 Honda Accord Wagon 
1992 Dodge Ram Charger 
1979 Chevrolet Pickup 









Petitioner requests that the above-entitled Court grant him the following temporary relief: 
1. That during the pendency of this action, Petitioner be awarded the temporary, sole 
legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, subject to reasonable rights of visitation for 
Respondent, as outlined in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-35 and §30-3-35.5 (a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference). 
2. That the Respondent shall maintain medical and health coverage for the parties' 
minor child and for the Petitioner, through her respective employment, during the pendency of 
this action. 
3. That during the pendency of this action, both parties should be ordered to share 
equally any anticipated temporary child care expenses, or after school care, so long as such expenses 
are actually incurred. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of any change of child care provider 
or change in the monthly expense of child care within thirty (30) days of the date of the change. 
4. That during the pendency of this action, Respondent should be ordered to pay child 
support to Petitioner, in the amount of $680.00 per month, which is according to the guidelines of 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7, et. seq. 
5. That during the pendency of this action, Respondent should be responsible for the 
temporary payment of all marital debts. 
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6. That during the pendency of this action, Petitioner is in need of temporary spousal 
support. Respondent has the ability to pay temporary spousal support and, therefore, Respondent 
should be ordered to pay to Petitioner the amount of $2,500.00 per month as and for temporary 
spousal support. 
7. Petitioner has the following monthly expenses: 
DESCRIPTION 
Sean's education (Vi of tuition amount 






Household Utilities (Gas, heat, 
electricity) 
1 Clothing 
[Home Repairs (Work typically done on 
monthly basis, as well as needed 
repairs Petitioner is working on.) 
Medical, prescription and grooming 
Miscellaneous (Wine, Sean's toys and 
activities, gifts and pets) 
Mobile Phones 
















Books and office supplies 
Entertainment 






Petitioner's ability to meet these needs 












8. That during the pendency of these proceedings, it is reasonable and necessary that 
Petitioner be entitled to temporary possession and maintenance of the parties' marital home. As 
Petitioner has been the primary caretaker of the parties' minor child and the marital home is the 
home where the child is comfortable and secure, allowing Petitioner to return to and remain in 
the home with the parties' minor child will minimize the negative impact that these proceedings 
will have upon the parties' minor child. 
9. That during the pendency of this action, it is reasonable and necessary that the 
parties temporarily divide personal property for the daily functions of living in a fair an equitable 
manner. Specifically, the Respondent should be entitled to her personal belongings and effects, 
5 
and to the automobile she is currently driving, subject to the expenses associated with said 
automobile. Petitioner should be entitled to his personal belongings and effects, and to the 
automobile he is currently driving, subject to the expenses associated with said automobile. 
10. That during the pendency of this action, both parties refrain from harassing, 
badgering, annoying or otherwise harm the other party. 
11. That during the pendency of this action, both parties to be restrained from 
transferring, encumbering, selling, disposing of, liquidating or otherwise alienating any and all 
marital assets without prior approval of the other party. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for the following relief: 
1. For an order of temporary custody of the parties' minor children to be awarded to 
Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable rights of visitation as outlined above. 
2. For an order of temporary maintenance of health care and expenses as set forth 
above. 
3. - For an order of temporary child support to be paid by Respondent to Petitioner in 
the amount of $680.00 per month. 
4. For an order of temporary spousal support to be paid by Respondent to Petitioner 
in the amount of $2,500.00 per month. 
5. For an order of temporary use and possession of the parties' marital home to 
Petitioner, as set forth above. 
6 
6. For an award to Petitioner of temporary attorneys' fees and court costs for having 
to bring this matter before the Court. 
7. For the parties to be mutually restrained from annoying, harassing each other as 
set forth above. 
8. For the parties to be restrained from transferring, encumbering, selling, disposing 
of, liquidating or otherwise alienating any and all marital assets, as jet forth above. 
9. For such other and further relief as to this Court ma> s^eem appropriate. 
DATED THIS [^ day of J?gS> 2004. 
CORPORONXWJLLIAIVJS^ 
/ ) / 




Attorney for Petitioner 
/ 
7 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
KENNETH RANSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: That 
he is the Petitioner in the above-captioned matter; that he has read the foregoing VERIFIED 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF, and that he understands the contents thereof, and that the 
same is true of his own personal knowledge, except as to those matters stated upon information and 
belief, and as to those matters, he believes the same to be true. 
KENNETH RANSON 
Petitioner 
ON THE ^ day of ^JjJ^^gJ^tsL 2004, personally appeared before me, the 
undersigned notary, KENNETH RANSON, the signer of the foregoing Verified Motion for 




MOTARY PUBLIC • STATE Of UTAH 
4637 GRffiN VAliEY DRIVE 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
MyComm. Exp. 07/31/2005 
NOTARY PUBL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the IS day of ^^D\O^Xsi^ , 2004,1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the below-named person: 
Marianna DiPaolo 
2096 East 10095 South 
Sandy, UT 84092 
Secretary 
9 
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ADDENDUM E 
KENNETHS MONTHLY STATEMENT OF NEEDS 
BY SECOND COUNSEL 
1 || James B. Hanks-Bar No. 4331 "••- -"f7 , V 
HANKS, ROOKER & DENNING, P.C. r V c 3 
2 II The Judge Building, Suite 740 
8 East Broadway 
3 || Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2204 
Telephone: 801/363-0940 
4 || Facsimile: 801/363-1338 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





AMENDED VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF 
Civil No. 044900818 DA 
Judge Joseph C. Frattq 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
[5 Petitioner, by and through his attorney, James B. Hanks of Hanks, Rooker and Denning, 
16 P.C, hereby moves the Court as follows: 
7 RELIEF SOUGHT 
8 II 1 . For an order awarding Petitioner temporary custody of the parties' minor child 
9 Sean Ranson, born December 2, 1987. 
10 2. For an order requiring the Respondent to pay Petitioner temporary child support in 
\\ the amount of $650.00 per month. 
12 3. For an order requiring the Respondent to pay Petitioner temporary alimony in the 
!3 amount of $2,204.00 per month. 
'A 4. For an order awarding the Petitioner the temporary use and possession of the 
15 parties' home located at 2096 East 10095 South, Sandy, Utah 84092. 
'6 5. For an order requiring the Respondent to maintain a policy of health and dental 
.7 || insurance on the Petitioner and the parties' minor child. 
.8 
»/ / 
1 6. For an order awarding the Petitioner his personal effects and sufficient home 
2 furnishings for himself and the minor child. 
3 FACTUAL BASIS 
4 This motion is based upon the following: 
5 1. The parties to this action are husband and wife, having been married in April, 
6 I 1984 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7 2. There has been one child born as issue of the marriage, to wit: Sean Ranson, born 
8 December 2, 1987. 
9 3. The Petitioner has been Sean's primary care giver for his entire life. Early in their 
10 relationship he was surprised to find that Ms. Di Paolo did not want to have children. He begged 
11 her to reconsider and she finally agreed to have a child only on the condition that he stay home to 
12 raise the child while she continued her career. She stressed that she was still on probationary 
13 status at the University of Utah and that it was very important that her career not be interrupted. 
14 4. The Petitioner agreed and after Sean was born he stayed home and cared for him. 
15 The Petitioner had the primary responsibility for safeguarding him, watching him play, bathing 
16 him, dressing him, feeding him, arranging for daycare, and providing playmates, entertainment, 
17 and activities. He also planned the meals, did the marketing, cooked the meals, did the dishes 
18 afterwards, washed the clothes and cleaned the home. 
19 5. As Sean grew it was the Petitioner's responsibility to take him to kindergarten and 
20 then school, to pick him up after class, to arrange for play time with his classmates, and to share 
21 child care responsibilities with the mothers when the children would play in groups in the 
22 afternoons. He was active on committees and volunteered to work in the schools and when Sean 
23 was accepted to the Jordan district ALPS program it was the Petitioner who fulfilled the required 
24 volunteer time. 
25 6. When Sean began having trouble in public school, it was the Petitioner who 
26 recognized that Sean was not being challenged enough to engage his interests. He then 
27 researched private schools, took Sean for campus visits, interviewed teachers and admissions 
28 officers, filled out the required parent forms, supervised Sean's completion of the student forms, 
1 took Sean to the tests, and arranged for financial support from his mother so that they could 
2 afford to send Sean to private school after he was admitted. 
3 7. The Petitioner now picks Sean up after school every day, asks him about the 
4 details of his day, and helps him with his homework. Sean asks questions during this time and it 
5 is then that the Petitioner is able to do a lot of teaching, not only about academic subjects, but 
6 about current events, practical matters, and the values of their family. The Petitioner goes over 
7 Sean's grades with him once a week and helps him set academic goals for himself and makes a 
8 plan for meeting them. He reads the information letters and emails sent to parents by the school 
9 and makes sure that the required responses are prepared and returned on time, helps Sean to 
10 decide which classes to take in order to make his course schedule, and coordinates his after 
11 school activities and makes sure Sean gets to them on time. 
12 8. The Petitioner also takes the primary responsibility for Sean's out of school 
13 activities. He drives Sean to his self defense classes, drives him to his friends houses to play, and 
14 drives him to the various places where he meets them. He always makes sure to meet Sean's 
15 friends and to make sure they are constructive positive people. He always goes into the places 
16 that Sean and his friends go together (card shops, computer gaming centers, arcades, pizza 
17 parlors) and makes sure that they are the kinds of places he would want Sean to go and that the 
18 people he sees there are people the Petitioner would want Sean to associate with. 
19 9. By any measure Sean has thrived under the Petitioner's care. Sean routinely 
20 scores in the 97th percentile and above on standardized tests. He has received numerous 
21 academic awards and distinctions including letters of commendation from Jordan School 
22 District, the Kiwanis Club Hope of America Award, and one first and one second place ribbon at 
23 the regional History Fair. In the last academic term he was named to the Headmaster's List, the 
24 highest honor roll at Rowland Hall-St. Mark's High School. 
25 10. Attached, as exhibit "A", is an affidavit of Sean's teacher, Peter Hayes, which 
26 verifies the Petitioner's involvement with the minor child's education. 
27 11. Attached, as exhibit "B" is a statement from Sean's friend, Ryan Soklaski, which 
28 supports the Petitioner's position that he has been the primary caretaker of Sean. 
tdo 
1 12. Because of the above, the court should continue, in force, the care taking 
2 arrangement which was utilized during the marriage and award Petitioner the primary custody of 
3 the child. 
4 13. During the course of their marriage the Respondent has experienced a tremendous 
5 increase in her earning power, her salary going from $17,000.00 to $84,000.00 annually. The 
6 Petitioner has played a direct and crucial role in this success above and beyond his role as 
7 homemaker and care giver. Without the efforts of the Petitioner the Respondent would not have 
8 a job at the University of Utah today and without his further efforts her salary would not have 
9 reached its current level. 
10 14. Respondent and Petitioner moved to Utah in August, 1982 so that Respondent 
11 could pursue her career as a professor of Linguistics. She had accepted a tenure track position at 
12 the University of Utah which meant that if, after a seven year probationary period, she passed a 
13 review she would be given a permanent job from which she could only be terminated for just 
14 cause. 
15 15. In the fall of 1988 the tenure review took place and Respondent was denied 
16 tenure. This meant that she would teach one more year and then be terminated from her job at 
17 the University. The reason given for her termination was that she had not published enough 
18 articles, that she was an indifferent teacher, and that she had not been active in service to the 
19 University. 
20 16. Respondent was crushed by this decision and told Petitioner at one point that she 
21 was planning to leave linguistics and become a librarian. Petitioner responded that he believed 
22 that the termination was unfair and that he was determined not to let it stand. He read 
23 "University Policies and Procedures" and found that it was possible for Respondent to appeal the 
24 decision. However, everyone he spoke to on campus told him that this was only a technical 
25 possibility, that in fact Respondent had been fired and that there was no way for her to get her job 
26 back. Petitioner also contacted 6 or 7 lawyers each of whom told him that they had no case and 
27 (J refused to represent Respondent. 
28 
an 
1 17. While it was true that Respondent had only published two articles and her 
2 department guidelines called for four, Petitioner believed that her firing was due as much to 
3 University politics as to her publication record. He therefore urged her to appeal her firing. She 
4 said that it was impossible. That she would have to teach her classes, complete her research, and 
5 prepare the appeal at the same time. She did not of course have to care for their child since 
6 Petitioner was already doing that. Petitioner then offered to do all of the work on the appeal so 
7 that Respondent could concentrate on her work. 
8 18. The Petitioner wrote all of the statements which Respondent was required to 
9 submit at each level of the appeal process which Respondent then edited and signed as her own 
10 work. Petitioner researched "University Policies and Procedures", which was like a body of law 
11 put together by several university committees, until he became the only one, in any capacity, 
12 familiar enough with it to follow the various lines of argument relating to an appeal though all of 
13 the sections and volumes where they appeared. 
14 19. Petitioner continued to interview attorneys until he found one who would agree to 
15 handle Respondent's case, although this attorney told Petitioner that they would not win and she 
16 didn't want him to have any illusions going in. Petitioner went over all of the recommendations 
17 from the administration and all of the minutes of faculty meetings on the matter, breaking them 
18 down into their essential facts and forming arguments in response. Petitioner went over the 
19 details of Marianna's career; her articles, her teaching assignments, all of her previous 
20 reviews and the instructions from her supervisors contained in them. Petitioner wrote requests 
21 for information from the University and department files, especially concerning previous tenure 
22 reviews. 
23 20. Petitioner contacted all of the external reviewers in Respondent's case and asked 
24 if he could quote their reviews and if they would like to comment on Respondent's appeal. 
25 Petitioner contacted professional organizations, women's organizations, senior colleagues in 
26 Respondent's field, and anyone else he thought could help. Petitioner even contacted his father's 
27 old college roommate who was then a field representative for the American Association of 
28 University Professors and asked for his help and advice. 
(j& 
1 21. Through this process Petitioner discovered that the last professor, a man, to be 
2 reviewed for tenure in Respondent's department before her had been tenured with only two 
3 articles. The department administration insisted that this man had published an article and a 
4 book. However, after several tries, Petitioner was able to speak to the professor in question on 
5 the phone and he confirmed that he had edited the book and that this was not the same as writing 
6 a book. He said that at his review he had only been given credit for writing the introduction, 
7 which counted as one small article. This meant that the Respondent was being denied tenure on 
8 nearly the same publication record as that which had obtained tenure for a male candidate. 
9 22. Petitioner also arranged for Professor William Labov of the University of 
10 Pennsylvania, the most distinguished scholar in America in Respondent's field, to come to Utah 
11 personally to testify that she was qualified for her job. 
12 23. These factors led the appeals committee to recommend a compromise to the 
13 administration. They agreed that Respondent's current record was not worthy of tenure but 
14 suggested an extension of her probationary period. The administration adamantly refused saying 
15 that such an action was prohibited under "Policies and Procedures". 
16 24. Petitioner then went over "Policies and Procedures" again and again until finally 
17 he found language that connected the tenure process to an obscure section that allowed the 
18 President of the University to take any personnel action he deemed to be in the best interests of 
19 the University. When Petitioner showed this to Respondent's attorney along with the evidence of 
20 gender discrimination she advised that they not accept an extension but rather sue. She said that 
21 if they did she believed she could obtain a financial settlement in the high six figures. This was 
22 the same attorney who had 12 months earlier, and before Petitioner had spent over a year 
23 working on the appeal, advised him that they were wasting their money in hiring her. 
24 25. It is literally and undeniably true that Respondent would not have a job at the 
25 University of Utah today if it weren't for Petitioner's work on her appeal. 
26 26. After the appeal Petitioner helped Respondent to complete her research, acting as 
27 an unpaid and uncredited researcher and co-author. In support of one of Respondent's articles 
28 Petitioner spent weeks in the University library going over the Utah census records from 1850 to 
6 
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1 1920. From these he wrote what was essentially a separate article on the ethnicity of the people 
2 of Utah. Respondent took sections of this and included them in her article on the use of 
3 propredicates in Utah which was published to wide acclaim. She signed this article as her 
4 own work and did not give Petitioner credit for the sections of his work that she used. 
5 27. Two years later Respondent was reviewed for tenure again. Petitioner again took 
6 primary responsibility for the tenure review process and wrote responses for Respondent's 
7 signature. After this review Respondent was granted tenure and for the first time a substantial 
8 increase in her salary. 
9 28. Even though Respondent now had a permanent job her salary was still abysmally 
10 low, being by far the lowest in her department and almost the lowest in the college. At the same 
11 time that Petitioner had been caring for Sean and handling Respondent's tenure appeal, he had 
12 been researching other job possibilities for Respondent. He wrote letters of application for 
13 several of these and as a result Respondent was interviewed for three different positions. 
14 Respondent was then offered a job at Oklahoma State University. Rather than allowing her to 
15 leave, the University of Utah chose to match this offer. This resulted in Respondent receiving 
16 her second substantial raise, her salary going from $25,500.00 to $29,000.00 annually. 
17 29. The Respondent's salary was still far too low compared to her peers so at her 
18 request the Petitioner reviewed the process by which Respondent's salary was determined. Every 
19 year professors at the University of Utah submit "Year's Work" forms that are essentially 
20 applications for raises. Petitioner found that Respondent's forms were undetailed, diffuse, and 
21 extremely passive, failing to lay out in strong terms the facts about the very good work she was 
22 doing. 
23 30. Petitioner began to write these forms for Respondent making them ten or fifteen 
24 times longer than they had been, adding more detail, and organizing that detail so that 
25 non-linguists could understand the value of her work. Respondent signed these forms, also, as he 




1 31. Even with these gains Respondent's salary was still far below that of her peers so 
2 Petitioner began to gather information for a lawsuit for gender discrimination. He had written 
3 letters which Respondent sent to the administration pointing out that her salary was unfairly 
4 low, when the administration approached Respondent and asked her to be Director of the 
5 Linguistics Program. They offered her no raise but said that the Director could expect regular 
6 annual raises which were a percentage of her salary. 
7 32. Petitioner advised Respondent in no uncertain terms that she must insist on a large 
8 equity raise before accepting the director's position. Petitioner told her to remind the 
9 administration that if they gave her a substantial raise now they would not only be doing the 
10 right thing, and getting a good director, but also avoiding a costly lawsuit. Respondent did this 
11 and received a $5,000.00 equity raise before accepting appointment. This represented a 14.7% 
12 increase from her former base salary. Since administrators are also paid an 11% bonus as 
13 compensation for their administrative work the actual increase was $5,555.00. As a result of 
14 their insistence that Respondent receive an equity raise before her appointment all of the 
15 subsequent annual percentage raises she received were added to a much higher base. Were it not 
16 for the work of the Petitioner the Respondent's salary would only be a fraction of its current 
17 level. 
18 33. After her appointment as Director, Petitioner continued to help Respondent with 
19 her career. A former colleague of hers sued the University and accused the Respondent, among 
20 others, of discrimination. After researching their records and engaging in a lengthy 
21 correspondence Petitioner was able to prove that the former colleague had engaged in tortious 
22 interference with Respondent's rights at the time of her tenure review and that there had been no 
23 wrongdoing on the Respondent's part. 
24 34. Today Respondent's salary is over $85,000.00 an achievement that is due, of 
25 course, to her own skill and efforts but which would not have been possible without Petitioner's 
26 dedicated support. There is one interesting irony that highlights this. A few years ago, the 
27 Respondent was appointed to serve on the committee that oversees the procedures for tenure 
28 reviews at the University. This was due in large part to her reputation for a detailed knowledge 
8 
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1 of ''Polices and Procedures". The beginning of her expertise in this area came from Petitioner's 
2 research on her appeal when he would pore over these volumes and explain them to her. 
3 35. Petitioner and Respondent' marriage has thus been very much an economic as 
4 well as a personal partnership. In addition to taking the primary responsibility for raising Sean, 
5 and taking care of the house, Petitioner has worked with Respondent on her career in much the 
6 same way two other people might work on a family owned business. Petitioner's efforts have 
7 been crucial to Respondent's success. Without him she would not have a job at the University of 
8 Utah today and without him her salary would be a fraction of what it is now. He has not been a 
9 passive observer of her career but has been an essential part of and a crucial participant in their 
10 success together. 
11 36. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired real property located at 
12 2096 East 100095 South, Sandy, Utah 84092 and more particularly described as follows: 
13 LOT 468 PARK CREST # 4 
14 PARCEL NO. 28-10-355-005 
15 The home does not have a mortgage. 
16 37. As set forth above, the Respondent is employed full-time as a professor at the 
17 University of Utah and earns $85,035.00 per year or $7,086.00 per month. The Petitioner has 
18 been the homemaker and the primary care giver of the parties' minor child throughout the 
19 parties' marriage. As such, he does not have any income. The Petitioner should not have income 
20 imputed to him until he has had time to complete his education and prepare to reenter the 





































38. The Petitioner currently has the following monthly expenses:1 
| DESCRIPTION 
Sean's education (Rowland Hall 
- Vi of tuition amount on 
monthly basis as Petitioner's 





Household Utilities (Gas, heat, 
electricity) 
1 Clothing 
Home Repairs (Work typically 
done on monthly basis, as well 
as needed repairs Petitioner is 
working on) 
Medical, prescription and 
grooming 
Mobile Phones 
Household Sundry Items 
Books and office supplies 
Entertainment 























 The Petitioner's table of expenses has been taken from the parties' actual expenses for 
the year 2002. For most of the entries, the Petitioner calculated the expense based on himself and 
































Anticipated tuition/fees at the 
University of Utah based on 12 





Petitioner's ability to meet these 
needs 








39. At the present time, the parties have the following assets: 
| ASSET 
Home 
TIAA - CREF Retirement 
Etrade Securities Account 
UofU Credit Union Account 
#469933 
UofU Credit Union Account 
#394735 
Automobiles: 
- 2002 Subaru Outback 
-1992 Honda Accord Wagon 
- 1992 Dodge Ram Charger 
- 1979 Chevrolet Pickup 
Computer and Office 
Equipment: 












49. The Petitioner abandoned his career and education when the minor child was bom 
and has been a homemaker for the Respondent and the minor child since that time. As such, the 




1 41. The Petitioner has college credits from many years ago that would give him 
2 sophomore standing. The Petitioner believes that it would take him five years to get a masters 
3 degree. 
4 42. The Respondent should be ordered to pay Petitioner alimony in the amount of 
5 $2,509.50 per month. This amount is necessary to equalize the parties' respective disposable 
6 incomes after supporting the child. 
7 Petitioner Respondent 
8 Gross Income $0.00 $7,086.00 
9 Tax (est.) $0.002 $1,417.003 
10 Child Support $0.00 $650.00 
11 $0.00 $5,019.00 
12 Difference in disposable income: $5,019.00 
13 Alimony necessary to equalize: $2,509.50 
14 l| WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that relief be entered consistent with the above. 
1 5 ij DATED and SIGNED this ^ y d a v of March, 2004. 
16 I HANKS, ROOKER & DENNING 
17 
18 
1 9 II Attorney for Petitioner 
20 || DATED and SIGNED this ^ 7 d a v of March, 2004. 
21 || PETITIONER 
22 
23 || Kenneth Clark Ranson 
24 
25 
2The Petitioner will likely have additional tax due to the receipt of alimony. 
26 
~7
 3The Respondent's taxes have been estimated at 20%. It should be indicated, however, 






























STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake : ss. 
On the / \day of March, 2004, personally appeared before me KENNETH 
CLARK RANSON: wno duly acknowledged to me that he has read the foregoing motion; that 
the same is true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and that he duly executed 
the same. 
[seal] " AMBER D.E.HENDRIX NOTWYPUBUC-STATCOFirrAH 
8 East BroadygySte.740 
Salt Lake Oat W » « " " » • 




KENNETH'S MONTHLY STATEMENT OF NEEDS 
BY THIRD COUNSEL FOR MEDIATION 
(RESPONDENT'S TRIAL EXHIBIT R-25) 
RANSON v. DiPAOLO 
Case No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
PETITIONER'S MONTHLY EXPENSES 
1 Rent or mortgage payments 
Real property taxes (residence) (current actual amount) 
1 Real property insurance (residence) 
1 Maintenance (residence) 
1 Food and household supplies 
I Restaurant and eating out . _. 
Utilities: 
1 Electricity 
1 Natural gas 
Water and Garbage 
Sewer 
1 Cable Television 
Internet 
1 Telephone: Home; Cellular; Long Distance 
1 Clothing, laundry & dry cleaning (Ken and Sean) 
| Medical, drugs and grooming 
1 Dental expenses 
| Insurance - Medical/Dental Ins. Premium for Kenneth 
I Insurance - Auto 
1 School - Sean's Tuition/Expenses 
I School - Kenneth's tuition and expenses 
1 Entertainment 
1 Health Club Membership ] 
1 Loan Repayment: Rose Ranson 
1 Travel | 
[Auto expense (gas /repairs & maintenance) 
1 Auto payments - | 
1 Legal Fees f 
j Misc. Cash Expenses ) 
1 Other: Wine, Sean's toys and activities, gifts, pets [ 
1 Books; Office Supplies; Postage [ 
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KENNETH'S MONTHLY STATEMENT OF NEEDS 
BY THIRD COUNSEL FOR TRIAL 
(PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT P-15) 
RANSON v. DiPAOLO 
Case No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
PETITIONER'S MONTHLY EXPENSES 
1 Rent or mortgage payments 
1 Real property taxes (residence) (current actual amount) 
1 Real property insurance (residence) 
1 Maintenance (residence) 
1 Food and household supplies 
1 Restaurant and eating out 
Utilities: 
Electricity 
1 Natural gas 
1 Water and Garbage 
1 Sewer 
1 Cable Television 
I Internet 
Telephone: Home; Cellular; Long Distance . 
Clothing, laundry & dry cleaning (Ken and Sean) 
1 Medical, drugs and grooming 
Dental expenses 
1 Insurance - Medical/Dental Ins. Premium for Kenneth 
1 Insurance - Auto 
1 School - Sean's Tuition/Expenses 
1 School - Kenneth's tuition and expenses 
1 Entertainment 
1 Health Club Membership 
1 Loan Repayment: Rose Ranson 
1 Travel 
Auto expense (gas / repairs & maintenance) 
Auto payments 
Legal Fees 
Misc. Cash Expenses 
Other: Wine, Sean's toys and activities, gifts, pets 
Books; Office Supplies; Postage 

































g ? EXHIBIT 
as- , .— 
ADDENDUM H 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 30-3-5 (1953 as amended) 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children -
Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -
Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and 
dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, 
or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current 
addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Recovery 
Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the 
court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be 
adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child 
care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by 
modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and 
other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
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(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court 
may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among 
other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation 
schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is 
made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was 
without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation 
order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or 
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing 
party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party 
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's 
skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend 
school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony 
on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of 
living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered 
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in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have 
been conceived or bom during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the 
condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the 
time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of 
the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 13, § 1; 
1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, ch. 261, § 1; 
1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 4; 1999, ch. 168, § 1; 1999, ch. 277, § 1; 
2001, ch. 255, § 4; 2003, ch. 176, § 3; 2005, ch. 129, § 1. 
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ADDENDUM I 
RULE 59, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced 
to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by 
the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may 
be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against 
law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision 
(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after 
such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court 
may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own 
initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
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ADDENDUMJ 
RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings 
and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out 
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a 
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the 
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request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited 
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or 
document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant 
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed 
except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of 
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of 
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to 
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exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility 
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions 
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, 
paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, 
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the 
appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in 
the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of 
Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the 
Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this 
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional 
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days 
before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief 
is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief 
for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal 
number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or 
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of 
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of 
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
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citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall 
without argument state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made 
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
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ADDENDUM K 
RULE 33, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal 
case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as 
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good 
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the 
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(c)(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary 
disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a 
motion or other paper. 
(c)(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the 
party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be 
awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the 
damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good 
cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(c)(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a 
hearing. 
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